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7 HAYWARD AREA RECREATION AND PARK
DISTRICT and KEVIN HART

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH P. CUVIELLO and DENIZ BOLBOL, individually,

Plaintiff,

V.

15 ROWELL RANCH RODEO, INC.,
16 HAYWARD AREA RECREATION AND
17 PARK DISTRICT, HAYWARD AREA
18 RECREATION AND PARK DISTRICT
PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGER/RANGER
KEVIN HART, and DOES 1 and 2, in
their individually and official capacities,
jointly and severally,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:23-cv-01652-VC

**DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF CROSS
MOTION AND CROSS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION AND OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS JOINT MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINT AND
AUTHORITIES (F.R.C.P. 56)**

Hon. Vince Chhabria

Date: August 15, 2024
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Ctrm: 4, 17th Floor

Trial: October 21, 2024

TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on August 15, 2024, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 4 of the above-entitled Court, located on the 17th Floor at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA, 94102, defendants HAYWARD AREA RECREATION AND PARK DISTRICT and HAYWARD AREA RECREATION AND PARK DISTRICT PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGER KEVIN HART (collectively “HARD Defendants”) will, and hereby do, move the Court for an order granting summary judgment or, in the alternative summary adjudication, in their favor, and against plaintiffs JOSEPH P. CUVIELLO and DENIZ BOLBOL (“Plaintiffs”)

1 with respect to the following in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint") or
 2 "SAC"), pursuant to FRCP §56:

- 3 1. Civil Code §52.1 (Bane Act) (Third Cause of Action);
- 4 2. Violation of Article I, Section 2(a) of the California State Constitution (Fifth
 Cause of Action);
- 5 3. Violation of First Amendment, Injunctive Relief under 42 U.S.C §1983
 Declaratory Relief under 28 U.S.C. §2201(a) (Sixth Cause of Action).
- 6 4. Punitive Damages

7 This motion is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, on the grounds
 8 that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the above-mentioned claims, and HARD
 9 Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, all causes of action fail
 10 because Mr. Hart acted reasonably and lawfully. The state-law claim for violation of the Bane Act
 11 fails because Mr. Hart did not have the apparent ability to arrest Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs were not
 12 reasonably in fear of arrest. Additionally, HARD Defendants are immune from Bane Act based
 13 on 820.2 immunity because the action of Mr. Hart was reasonable and lawful. The Violation of
 14 Article I of the California State Constitution fails because Mr. Hart acted reasonably, and the
 15 equitable remedies are moot. The Section 1983 claims against the individual defendant fail
 16 because Mr. Hart is entitled to qualified immunity and the equitable remedies are moot. Federal
 17 and state punitive damages are barred because there was no evil motive, reckless disregard,
 18 malice, oppression, or fraud against Plaintiffs.

19 This motion is further based on this Notice, on the Memorandum of Points and
 20 Authorities below, on the declaration of Nicholas D. Syren filed herewith and all exhibits
 21 attached thereto, the declaration of Kevin Hart and all exhibits attached thereto, on the [proposed]
 22 Order, on the Court's file in this matter, and on such oral and/or documentary evidence as may be
 23 presented at the hearing of this motion.

24 **STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT**

25 Defendants seek an order granting summary judgment or in the alternative adjudication in
 26 their favor, and against Plaintiffs, with respect to the following portions of Plaintiffs' Second

1 Amended Complaint: the third cause of action (California Civil Code §52.1 -- Bane Act); the fifth
2 cause of action (Violation of Article I, Section 2(a) of the California State Constitution); the sixth
3 cause of action (Violation of First Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 et. al); and punitive
4 damages.

5

6 Respectfully submitted,

7

Dated: June 28, 2024

8

9 ALLEN, GLAESSNER,
10 HAZELWOOD & WERTH, LLP

11

12 By: /s/ Nicholas D. Syren
13 DALE L. ALLEN, JR.
14 NICHOLAS D. SYREN
15 Attorneys for Defendants
16 HAYWARD AREA RECREATION AND
17 PARK DISTRICT and KEVIN HART

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Other Statutes

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

This motion presents the following issues to be decided:

1. Whether there is a triable issue that Mr. Hart's actions violated the Bane Act;
2. Whether Government Code section 820.2 immunizes Defendants from liability;
3. Whether qualified immunity or remedies apply to the Fifth Cause of Action; and
4. Whether Plaintiff may recover for punitive damages.

I. INTRODUCTION

The undisputed facts regarding the events of May 20, 2022, at Rowell Ranch Rodeo show:

(1) Plaintiffs were never arrested, (2) Plaintiffs were never threatened with arrest nor other violent act; (3) Plaintiffs and their fellow protestors never had their banners and signs interfered with nor their protesting stopped for one second; (4) No acts of physical intimidation occurred; (5) Most notably the video evidence shows Plaintiffs were never actually afraid of arrest nor any act of violence against them by Mr. Hart; and, (6) Mr. Hart had no authority to effectuate an arrest nor carried handcuffs. The uncontested video evidence proves Mr. Hart never used the words "arrest" "citation" "detention" nor threatened any violent act.

For the aforementioned reasons, namely, a lack of case law that imposes liability on Mr. Hart and HARD, and the applicability of available immunities, Mr. Hart and HARD move for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication against Plaintiffs' causes of action against Mr. Hart and HARD for Bane Act, Violation of California Constitution and First Amendment. Additionally, Plaintiffs' First Amendment cause of action is no longer viable due to Judge Chhabria's reasoning in his Order regarding TRO (Dkt. 46). Also Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 related cause of action is barred by qualified immunity and failure to meet the requirements of equitable relief (preliminary and permanent injunction) as outlined below.

HARD and Hart do not dispute Plaintiffs argument that the "Free Speech Zone" as constituted at the date of the event was an unreasonable time, place and manner restriction of free speech. However, they do dispute any violation of law occurred here. Moreover, HARD and Hart are immune from liability based on Government Code section 820.2 which protects a public employee from an act or omission where the act is a result of the exercise of discretion vested in

1 him. Notably, no actual harm occurred here. Protestors including Plaintiffs were allowed to
 2 protest at all times in the front ticket booth area and no rights were actually harmed. Lastly, Mr.
 3 Hart never had the authority nor ability to arrest Plaintiffs. For these reasons HARD Defendants
 4 respectfully request the Court grant its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment or in the alternative
 5 Motion for Summary Adjudication, and deny Plaintiffs' Joint Motion for Partial Summary
 6 Judgment.

7 **II. FACTS**

8 **A. Plaintiffs' History of Arrests at Demonstrations**

9 Plaintiffs have a lengthy history of arrests and interactions with law enforcement at
 10 demonstrations. Plaintiff Bolbol estimates that she has been arrested 3-5 times at demonstrations.
 11 (Depo Transcript of Deniz Bolbol "Bolbol Depo", 13:7-15, Decl. of Nico Syren ¶ 1). Plaintiff
 12 Cuvillo testified he has been arrested at least 4 times since 2001 at animal rights demonstrations.
 13 (Depo Transcript of Joseph Cuvillo "Cuvillo Depo", 24:24-25, 25:1-5 Decl. of Syren ¶ 2). All
 14 of Mr. Cuvillo's noted arrests ended in lawsuits. (Cuvillo depo, 37:18-20). Plaintiff Cuvillo
 15 was given warning of arrest in at least three of the four scenarios prior to arrest since 2001.
 16 (Cuvillo depo, 35:6-9). In one scenario in or around 2013 Plaintiffs Cuvillo and Bolbol were
 17 present when a San Francisco Police Officer told Plaintiffs they would be subject to arrest if they
 18 continued protesting outside of a free speech zone. (Cuvillo depo, 28:11-22). Plaintiffs moved to
 19 the free speech zone so as not to be arrested. (Cuvillo depo, 29: 17-24). Plaintiff Cuvillo nor
 20 Plaintiff Bolbol could not recall if they had ever seen or interacted with Kevin Hart prior to May
 21 20, 2022. (Cuvillo depo, 55:6-15, Bolbol depo, 41:21-25, 42:1).

22 **B. Rowell Ranch Rodeo Event**

23 Defendant Rowell Ranch Rodeo holds an annual 3-day rodeo event every year at Rowell
 24 Ranch Rodeo which is open to the public. HARD owns the subject property which is closed to the
 25 public the vast majority of the year but opens for select events including the May 20 – May 22,
 26 2022, event at issue here. Kevin Hart was on duty as the Public Safety Manager with a shirt
 27 identifying himself as such at Rowell Ranch Rodeo on the evening of May 20, 2022. (*Declaration
 28 of Kevin Hart*, ¶ 3). This was an event with private security and also included members of the

1 Alameda County Sheriff's Department. A security plan was created by the Rodeo group renting
 2 the park for the day which Mr. Hart was aware of from his previous review and approval. (*Decl.*
 3 *of K. Hart*, ¶ 4). The "free speech area" was designated in the immediate area of the entrance to
 4 the parking lot. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 5).

5 **C. Events of May 20, 2022, Prior to Mr. Hart's Interaction with Plaintiffs**

6 Mr. Hart observed Plaintiffs Cuvillo and Bolbol approaching the ticket booth area of
 7 park property on foot holding signs with graphic pictures of animal abuse. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 6).
 8 None of these individuals made any attempt to pay an entrance fee or enter the park. Mr. Hart
 9 observed Plaintiffs and other individual demonstrators standing directly in front of the security
 10 entrance and attempting to block visitors to the rodeo from entering the rodeo event ticket booth
 11 entrance. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 7). Mr. Hart observed Plaintiffs and demonstrators hold their signs
 12 and shout to individual visitors and de-cry how they could watch such an event where animal
 13 abuse happens. Mr. Hart received complaints relayed to him by Rowell Ranch volunteers that
 14 rodeo visitors felt their peace was being disturbed by the demonstrators. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 8).

15 Prior to Mr. Hart's interactions with Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs were near the front ticket booth
 16 entrance and saw Alameda County Sheriff's Officers starting to approach them from a distance.
 17 Before any interaction with HARD, Mr. Hart or the Alameda County Sheriff's Department
 18 Plaintiff Bolbol stated, "We got a lawsuit. Here we go." (*Plaintiffs' Video Transcript.*, at 13:8,
 19 attached as Ex. "C" to Syren Decl.).

20 **D. Mr. Hart's Initial Interaction with Plaintiffs on May 20, 2022**

21 Mr. Hart approached an individual later identified as Plaintiff Cuvillo who appeared to
 22 be the group leader and advised him there was a designated free speech area located towards the
 23 front entrance of the parking lot area. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 9). Mr. Hart observed demonstrators
 24 including Plaintiffs continue to demonstrate when requested to move to the designated free
 25 speech area and at times blocked the vehicle gate area being used by vehicle traffic. (*Decl. of K.*
 26 *Hart*, ¶ 10). Mr. Hart observed Plaintiffs refuse to move and refuse to stop blocking visitors from
 27 entering the rodeo. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 11).

28 Mr. Hart had no intention of stopping the demonstrators from demonstrating at any time.

1 (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 15). Additionally, Mr. Hart had no intention of physically moving Plaintiffs
 2 or to intimidate, coerce or threaten Plaintiffs with arrest. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 16). Mr. Hart had no
 3 authority to arrest Plaintiffs. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 18). At no time did Mr. Hart instruct Alameda
 4 County Deputies to arrest Plaintiffs nor instruct Alameda County Deputies to threaten Plaintiffs
 5 with arrest. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 19). Mr. Hart did not coordinate nor plan a response to the
 6 demonstrators with Deputy Mayfield nor anyone else from the Alameda County Sheriff's
 7 Department at any time prior to his interactions with Plaintiff. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 20). Mr. Hart
 8 had no weapon on his person during his interactions with Plaintiffs nor any handcuffs. (*Decl. of*
 9 *K. Hart*, ¶ 22). Mr. Hart never raised his voice nor stepped toward Plaintiffs to make them feel
 10 intimidated or threatened. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 23). Plaintiff Bolbol only heard "bits and pieces" of
 11 the conversation with Mr. Hart and testified that "I don't recall paying full attention to it." (*Bolbol*
 12 *Dep. Tr.*, at 55:10-14, 56:14-16, attached as Ex. "B" to Syren Decl.) ("Bolbol"). Plaintiff Cuvillo
 13 testified he did not believe Mr. Hart had the ability to arrest him at the time of the incident.
 14 (Cuvillo depo, 56:21-25, Ex. A to Syren Decl.).

15 The entire interaction with the demonstrators and Mr. Hart is found in the uncontested
 16 video evidence where Mr. Hart states, "...So here's the designated area. I'm asking you to go to
 17 the designated area that's been predesignated and approved. All right? Failure to do so, all right,
 18 will not be good." (*County of Alameda Officer Body Camera Video Transcript.*, at 14:23 – 15:2,
 19 attached as Ex. "D" to Syren Decl.).).

20 Plaintiff Bolbol then states, "We're not going." (*Id.* at 15:3). Plaintiff Cuvillo then states,
 21 "What is going to happen if we don't do so? What's going to happen if we don't do so?" (*Id.* at
 22 15:4-15:5). Mr. Hart replies, "You'll have to figure that out when it happens." (*Id.* at 15:6-15:7).
 23 Plaintiff Cuvillo then approaches Deputy Mayfield and asks, "Are you going to arrest us if we
 24 don't go there?" (*Id.* at 15:13 - 15:14). Plaintiff Cuvillo moments later states (directed toward
 25 Deputy Mayfield), "I don't want to be could be arrested, I want to know ahead of time. You need
 26 to call your watch commander out here because we have a free speech right." (*Id.* at 15:24 –
 27 16:2). Importantly Plaintiff Cuvillo then states interrupting Deputy Mayfield that, "...So if – if
 28 you're going to arrest us, I want to know, because I don't want to be arrested. So if you're going

1 to arrest me illegally, I want to know because I don't want to be arrested. And there's none of this
 2 maybe, could be; I want you to tell me before, I'm going to arrest you if you don't leave. If you
 3 don't tell me that, then there's a big problem." (*Id.* at 16:18-16:24). Plaintiff Bolbol then says, "I
 4 think they're messing with you, Pat." (*Id.* at 16:25-17:1). Plaintiff Bolbol then stated referring to
 5 Deputy Mayfield, "Now he's calling his boss to see if he can get permission to arrest us." (*Id.* at
 6 26:9 – 26:11).

7 As most visitors got into the park to watch the rodeo, the demonstrators left the area
 8 without incident. Mr. Hart had no further contact with Plaintiffs. (*Decl. of K. Hart,* ¶26). Later on
 9 Plaintiff Bolbol stated, "Yeah, the guy --- the guy who's talking to the, I don't know, the
 10 overweight one, he really wanted to arrest us, but doesn't get to. His watch commander has a
 11 level head, isn't willing to beat constitutional violation of an illegal arrest. You know how much
 12 it would have cost this county if they would have illegally arrested us?... Hundreds of thousands
 13 of dollars." (*Plaintiffs' Video Transcript.*, at 20:17-20:23), attached as Ex. "C" to Syren Decl. ¶
 14 5). Plaintiffs did not appear afraid of arrest at any time. (*Decl. of K. Hart,* ¶ 24). Plaintiffs were
 15 never stopped from protesting nor physically forced to move to the "Free Speech Area." (*Decl. of*
 16 *K. Hart,* ¶ 25).

17 **III. PLEADINGS/PROCEDURAL STATUS**

18 Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on April 6, 2023. Plaintiffs filed their First Amended
 19 Complaint on May 5, 2023. Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on
 20 June 20, 2023. (Dkt. No. 54, at ¶¶ 92-139, Request for Judicial Notice ¶ 1.). The SAC contains
 21 causes of action against Defendants HARD and Mr. Hart for: (1) Violation of California Civil
 22 Code, section 52.1(c), Bane Act (Third Cause of Action); (2) Violation of Article I, Section 2(a)
 23 of the California and State Constitution (Fifth Cause of Action); and (3) Violation of First
 24 Amendment, as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment (Relief under 42. U.S.C.
 25 section 1983) (Sixth Cause of Action). Defendant HARD and Mr. Hart filed an answer to the
 26 SAC on July 5, 2023. (Dkt. No. 59, RJS ¶ 2).

27 Plaintiffs' SAC alleges "On May 20, 2022, DEFENDANT HART and DEFENDANT
 28 DEPUTY MAYFIED, *working in concert*, threatened to arrest PLAINTIFFS if they did not move

1 to the “Free Speech Area.” (Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 94). The SAC continues, “DEFENDANT HART
 2 continued to harass PLAINTIFFS. He told PLAINTIFFS they had to go to the designated “Free
 3 Speech Area”, and he said, “Failure to do so will not be good.” (*Id.* at ¶ 96) “DEFENDANT
 4 HART then said, “You’ll have to figure out.” (*Id.* at ¶ 97). “PLAINTIFFS took these statements
 5 to mean that the PLAINTIFFS could be arrested as a form of intimidation and coercion so that
 6 PLAINTIFFS would voluntarily acquiesce and give up their right to free speech near the
 7 entrance.” (*Id.* at ¶ 98). Plaintiffs allege that the rights attempted to be violated including “(a) the
 8 right of protection from bodily harm pursuant to California Civil Code, section 43 and (b) the
 9 right to be free from interference, or retaliation from their exercise of constitutionally protected
 10 rights, including but not limited to speech, press, association, conscience, and beliefs as secured
 11 by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution and California Constitution...”
 12 (*Id.* at ¶ 102).

13 Plaintiffs do not allege a conspiracy cause of action nor explain in detail how Defendants
 14 were coordinating or “working in concert” instead concluding that Deputy Mayfield and Mr. Hart
 15 were “working in concert” in allegedly violating Plaintiffs rights constituting a Bane Act
 16 violation.

17 **IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

18 **A. Standard for Summary Judgment**

19 Summary judgment is proper if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
 20 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears
 21 the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which
 22 demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); *Celotex Corp. v.*
 23 *Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets its
 24 initial burden, then the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
 25 genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A genuine issue for trial exists if there is sufficient
 26 evidence for a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
 27 moving party, to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477
 28 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Material facts are those “that might affect

1 the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” (*Id.*) If the nonmoving party fails to make the
 2 requisite showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” *Celotex*, 477
 3 U.S. at 323. And a genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a
 4 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” *See id.* Thus, the “purpose of
 5 summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there
 6 is a genuine need for trial,’” and where “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier
 7 of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” *Matsushita Elec.
 8 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations omitted)).

9 1. Issue for the Court to Determine

10 The main issue here is for the Court to determine whether the undisputed evidence rises to
 11 the level of a Bane Act violation as a matter of law in favor of HARD Defendants, or whether the
 12 uncontested evidence shows a triable issue of fact requiring determination by a jury. As stated
 13 below, HARD Defendants argue that no case law extends judgment as a matter of law to
 14 Plaintiffs based on the facts as presented in Plaintiffs’ moving papers. Conversely, HARD
 15 Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on the uncontested video evidence and
 16 accompanying evidence proving no ‘actual harm’ was suffered here by Plaintiffs and they cannot
 17 establish one or more elements required for a Bane Act violation.

18 B. Bane Act Standard

19 A Section 52.1 claim requires a showing that the defendant, “by the specified improper
 20 means of threats, intimidation, or coercion, tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing
 21 something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that
 22 he or she was not required to do under the law.” *Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist.*, 149
 23 Cal.App.4th 860, 883 (2007). To prevail on a Bane Act claim, Plaintiffs must show two things:
 24 (1) Defendants attempted to, or did, interfere with their statutory or constitutional rights; and (2)
 25 the attempted, or actual, interference was accompanied by threats, intimidation, or coercion. Cal.
 26 Civ. Code, §52.1(b); *See Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco*, 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 791
 27 (2017).

28 The in case *In re M.S.*, “Subdivision (j) of Civil Code section 52.1 provides that speech

1 alone is insufficient to support such an action, except upon a showing that the speech itself
 2 threatens violence against a specific person or group of persons, the person or group of persons
 3 against whom the speech is directed ‘reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will
 4 be committed against them or their property and that the person threatening violence has the
 5 apparent ability to carry out the threat.’ . . . The presence of the express ‘reasonable fear’ element,
 6 in addition to the ‘apparent ability’ element, in Civil Code section 52.1, governing civil actions
 7 for damages, most likely reflects the Legislature’s determination [that] ***a defendant’s civil***
 8 ***liability should depend on the harm actually suffered by the victim.”*** (*In re M.S., supra*, (1995)
 9 10 Cal.4th 698, 715 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].) The Bane Act “was intended to
 10 address only egregious interferences with constitutional rights, not just any tort.” *Shoyoye v. Cty.*
 11 *of Los Angeles*, 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 (2012). “The act of interference with a constitutional
 12 right must itself be deliberate or spiteful.” *Id.*

13 In *Cuviello v. City & County of San Francisco*, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1102 (N.D. Cal.
 14 2013) (hereinafter “CCSF”) Plaintiffs cited this case as sufficient to show “Threat of arrest
 15 suffices to demonstrate ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’ under the Bane Act. In CCSF
 16 demonstrators including Plaintiff Cuviello demonstrated with banners in an area near San
 17 Francisco’s Union Square and were requested to move to the pre-designated free speech zone.
 18 (*Id.* at 1077-1078). Plaintiff Cuviello was cited and found to be threatened with arrest after an
 19 unambiguous warning of arrest and threat of placement in handcuffs if he did not move by a
 20 uniformed police officer. *Id.* at 1103. Plaintiff was cited and moved to the free speech area. (*Id.* at
 21 1078). However, the facts of the CCSF case are easily distinguishable here. First, the threat of
 22 arrest was plain and unambiguous. Second, Plaintiffs’ banners and materials were tampered with
 23 and actually interfered with their freedom of expression, and Plaintiffs were actually cited by law
 24 enforcement and threatened with handcuffs and arrest. These facts are distinguishable as none of
 25 those facts occurred here, as no threat of arrest was actually stated. Additionally, Mr. Hart did not
 26 have the apparent authority to arrest Plaintiffs compared with the San Francisco Police Officer in
 27 the CCSF case who clearly did have that authority. Therefore, the CCSF case is not on point here
 28 and should not be used as precedent.

1 Lastly, the Court should look to the California Jury Instruction on the Bane Act outlined
 2 in CACI 3066. The Essential Factual Elements for a Bane Act Violation state:

3 ///

4 “[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] intentionally interfered with [or
 5 attempted to interfere with] [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] civil rights by threats,
 6 intimidation, or coercion.

7 To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:1. [That by
 8 threats, intimidation or coercion, [name of defendant] caused [name of plaintiff] to
 9 reasonably believe that if [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] exercised [his/her/nonbinary
 10 pronoun] right [insert right, e.g., “to vote”], [name of defendant] would commit violence
 11 against [[him/her/nonbinary pronoun]/ [or] [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] property] and that
 12 [name of defendant] had the apparent ability to carry out the threats;]”

13 As stated in the argument section below, Plaintiff cannot establish one or more of the
 14 required elements namely: (1) Reasonable belief of arrest or other violent act by Mr. Hart; (2)
 15 Lack of threats, intimidate or coercion; and (3) Plaintiffs lack of belief that Mr. Hart had the
 16 ability to carry out the alleged threats.

17 C. **No Reasonable Jury Would Find Plaintiffs Were in ‘Reasonable Fear’ of**
 18 **Arrest**

19 At trial, a jury would be required to determine whether [That by threats, intimidation or
 20 coercion, *Mr. Hart* caused Plaintiffs Cuvillo and Bolbol to *reasonably believe* that if they
 21 exercised their First Amendment right, *Mr. Hart* would commit violence against them, or their
 22 property and that *Mr. Hart* had the apparent ability to carry out the threats]. (See *3066 Bane Act –*
Essential Factual Elements Jury Instructions (Civ. Code § 52.1)). Despite Plaintiff’s reliance on
Richardson v. City of Antioch, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2010), here a jury would
 23 make a determination if Plaintiffs Bolbol and Cuvillo did reasonably believe that Mr. Hart would
 24 commit an act of arrest or violence against them. The record clearly shows they were not in fear
of arrest at time of the incident.

25 No jury would find all elements would be met based on the facts here including the
 26 following elements: (1) Mr. Hart’s words and actions constituted threats, intimidation or
 27 coercion; (2) Mr. Hart caused Plaintiffs to reasonably believe that if they exercised their First

1 Amendment right, Mr. Hart would commit violence against them or their property; and (3) Mr.
 2 Hart had the apparent ability to carry out the threats.

3 Defendants' Police Practices Expert Jim Dudley's expert Opinion Five states, "The
 4 protesters were not threatened with arrest at the event. There were no threats of arrest made to
 5 Cuvillo, Bolbol or any of the other protesters at Rowell Ranch on 05/20/2022. Although law
 6 enforcement officers must advise a person of what they are being arrested, there is no requirement
 7 to advise them of what they could be arrested. At various times throughout, especially in the
 8 initial meeting with Deputies, the subsequent meeting with Hart present, and the exchange with
 9 Deputy Mayfield and Sage, the plaintiffs Cuvillo and Bolbol did not act intimidated or
 10 threatened by Hart or the deputies. Instead, Cuvillo and Bolbol were abrasive, interrupting the
 11 instructions and making declarations that the security staff nor deputies knew about their rights to
 12 protest. They harangued and lectured the deputies and Hart with their perception of their rights
 13 and declared that they wanted to arrest the protesters but were denied by their commander. (See
 14 Dudley Expert Report p. 14, Exh. "I" to Syren Decl. ¶ 11).

15 Further, Mr. Dudley stated, "in my professional opinion that the protesters, specifically
 16 Mr. Pat Cuvillo and Ms. Deniz Bolbol seemed intent on confronting law enforcement and
 17 security at the rodeo to draw attention and create conflict. The demands that were made to Public
 18 Safety Manager Hart and to the ACSO Deputies seemed intent to explicitly say that if Cuvillo,
 19 Bolbol and the others did not move from their location and relocate to the 'Free Speech Area' that
 20 they would be arrested. Indeed, no one ever said that to protesters. It is proven by the fact that
 21 there were no arrests made, even though the protesters remained at walkways, in front of ticket
 22 booths, restrooms and to the entrance to the rodeo events." (Dudley Expt. Rept. p. 16).

23 1. Plaintiff Cuvillo's Reasonable Fear of Arrest on May 20, 2022

24 First, no reasonable jury would find that element (2) of CACI 3066 'reasonable belief'
 25 standard has been met here. Plaintiff Cuvillo's response to Mr. Hart's comments requesting they
 26 move to the Free Speech Zone is to immediately confront Deputy Mayfield and ask him if he was
 27 subject to arrest. (*Ex. D* to Syren Decl. at 15:24 – 16:2). Plaintiff Cuvillo then requested Deputy
 28 Mayfield call his watch commander to determine if the demonstrators including Plaintiffs were

1 subject to arrest. (*Id.* at 15:24 – 16:2). These actions alone prove that Plaintiff Cuviello was not in
 2 fear of arrest at any time and needed further clarification from County of Alameda deputies
 3 regarding the possibility of his imminent arrest. Based on prior demonstrations by Plaintiffs, each
 4 Plaintiff had been arrested or threatened with arrest on numerous occasions. Most notably in San
 5 Francisco at the Union Square protest in or around 2013, Plaintiffs were threatened with arrest
 6 and cited. Based on this threat of arrest, the Plaintiffs both moved to the Free Speech Zone
 7 because they feared arrest. Conversely here, Plaintiffs never left the front ticket booth area, nor
 8 were ever stopped from demonstrating at any time. Moreover, Plaintiff Cuviello stepped forward
 9 into the personal space of both Mr. Hart and Deputy Mayfield acting as aggressor seemingly
 10 without fear of Mr. Hart; Mr. Hart never physically intimidated Plaintiffs nor threatened Plaintiffs
 11 with weapons; Mr. Hart never used the word “arrest” at any time and Plaintiff Cuviello admitted
 12 he did not believe Mr. Hart had the ability to arrest him. These facts tend to prove that no
 13 reasonable jury would find Plaintiff Cuviello was in reasonable fear of arrest.

14 2. Plaintiff Bolbol’s Reasonable Fear of Arrest on May 20, 2022

15 As stated above, at deposition Plaintiff Bolbol only heard “bits and pieces” of the
 16 conversation with Mr. Hart and testified that “I don’t recall paying full attention to it.” (*Bolbol*
 17 *Dep. Tr.*, at 55:10-14, 56:14-16). Thus, it’s unclear exactly what Plaintiff Bolbol heard at the time
 18 Mr. Hart spoke to Plaintiffs over the approximate three-minute period that is the subject of its
 19 Bane Act cause of action. This alone leaves Plaintiff Bolbol’s Bane Act claims subject to
 20 summary judgment as one cannot be in reasonable fear of arrest if they did not hear the words
 21 uttered by Mr. Hart. The same argument made above regarding Plaintiff Cuviello’s reasonable
 22 fear is also made here in regard to Plaintiff Bolbol’s reasonable fear of arrest based on here
 23 previous demonstration activity including the event at San Francisco’s Union Square in which
 24 demonstrators were threatened with arrest and cited.

25 For these reasons, no reasonable jury could find Plaintiffs were in ‘reasonable fear’ of
 26 arrest at the time of the incident in question on May 20, 2022.

27 D. **Plaintiffs Suffered No Actual Harm as Outlined in the Standard of *In re MS***

28 Relevant case law states, “The presence of the express “reasonable fear” element, in

1 addition to the “apparent ability” element, in Civil Code section 52.1, governing civil actions for
 2 damages, most likely reflects the Legislature’s determination a defendant’s civil liability should
 3 depend on the harm actually suffered by the victim.” *In re M.S.*, (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 715.

4 As stated above Plaintiffs faced no actual harm based on Mr. Hart’s actions. They were
 5 not in reasonable fear of arrest nor stopped from demonstrating at any time. Their signs nor their
 6 pamphlets were destroyed nor tampered with. Mr. Hart’s specific words did not cause reasonable
 7 fear of arrest. Combined with the testimony from Plaintiff Cuvillo that at the time of the incident
 8 he did not believe Mr. Hart had the ability to arrest him, Mr. Hart committed no harm towards
 9 Plaintiff Cuvillo. As to Plaintiff Bolbol, as previously mentioned she only heard “bits and
 10 pieces” of Mr. Hart’s statements. Plaintiff Bolbol suffered no actual harm as she did not hear
 11 significant portions of Mr. Hart’s statement at the time of the incident. The statement was directed
 12 toward Mr. Cuvillo as the apparent leader of the group. Ms. Bolbol then stated that she believed
 13 Mr. Hart and Deputy Mayfield were “just messing” with Plaintiff Cuvillo. Based on the standard
 14 set forth in *In re MS* Plaintiffs continued unabated by Mr. Hart to demonstrate throughout the
 15 remaining evening and weekend at Rowell Ranch. Plaintiffs even took a photograph at the end of
 16 their demonstration along with other demonstrators that clearly show smiles and feelings of
 17 positivity not harm. The facts prove that no ‘actual harm’ was suffered by the Plaintiffs.

18 **E. HARD Defendants Immune based on Government Code section 820.2**

19 To the extent deemed involved, Government Code section 820.2 also immunizes the
 20 individual defendants including Mr. Hart against the state-law claims. That provision states, in
 21 pertinent part, that “a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission
 22 where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or
 23 not such discretion be abused.” California courts apply the immunity to “deliberate and
 24 considered policy decisions, in which a [conscious] balancing [of] risks and advantages ... took
 25 place.” *Conway v. Cnty. of Tuolumne*, 231 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1015 (2014) (internal quotations
 26 and citations omitted.) It has been applied to “the decision to pursue a fleeing vehicle, the
 27 decision to investigate an accident or not, the decision not to make an arrest, and the decision
 28 whether to use official law enforcement authority to resolve a dispute.” *Bazan v. Curry*, No.

1 E075075, 2022 WL 16847782, at *5 (Cal.Ct.App. Nov. 10, 2022).

2 Immunity applies here because the decision to arrest or not to arrest and to investigate the
 3 complaints regarding Plaintiffs has been found to be a cognizable rationale for applying section
 4 820.2 immunity. (See *Bazan v. Curry* at 5 regarding the decision to not make an arrest and the
 5 decision to use official law enforcement authority to resolve a dispute). To the extent it is deemed
 6 involved and/or responsible for the actions of its employees including Mr. Hart, HARD is equally
 7 immune. See Government Code §815.2(b).)

8 **F. Mr. Hart's Inability to Arrest Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Belief at Time of**
 9 **Incident Proves HARD Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment on the**
Bane Act

10 Mr. Hart had no authority to arrest Plaintiffs. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 18). A violation of the
 11 Bane Act requires that Plaintiffs reasonably believed Mr. Hart had the apparent ability to
 12 effectuate an arrest. (See *CACI Jury Instruction 3066, Bane Act*). (*Bane Act*) liability may not be
 13 based on “Speech alone” unless “the speech itself threatens violence against a specific person or
 14 group of persons; and the person or group of persons against whom the threat is directed
 15 reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their
 16 property and ***that the person threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the***
 17 ***threat.***” [*Civ. Code, §52.1, subd. (j)*]; § 3:19. *Prohibited conduct: interference or attempted*
 18 *interference by threats, intimidation or coercion; speech alone insufficient unless it threatens*
 19 *violence, Cal. Civ. Prac. Civil Rights Litigation* §3:19.

20 As stated above Plaintiff Cuvillo testified that he did not believe Mr. Hart had the ability
 21 to arrest him at the time of the incident. (Cuvillo depo, 56:21-25, Ex. A to Syren Decl.).
 22 Additionally, Plaintiff Bolbol only heard “bits and pieces” of Mr. Hart’s comments directed
 23 toward the demonstrators and Plaintiff Cuvillo. These facts alone prove that Plaintiffs never
 24 reasonably believed Mr. Hart had the ability to carry out the alleged threat of arrest. Additionally,
 25 Plaintiff Bolbol is heard on video stating “I think they’re trying to mess with you Pat,” inferring
 26 that she did not believe Mr. Hart nor anyone else was attempting to arrest or threaten arrest
 27 anyone including Plaintiffs. When the situation is taken in context, it’s clear from the record that
 28 Plaintiffs did not believe Mr. Hart had the ability to arrest them, a requirement of CACI 3066.

1 Without this requirement of the element of the Bane Act, their Bane Act claim fails. Thus, HARD
 2 Defendants have presented the requisite facts to establish summary judgment on the issue of the
 3 ‘apparent ability’ of Mr. Hart to arrest them.

4 **G. Mr. Hart’s Words and Actions Did Not Constitute Threats, Intimidation or**
Coercion

5 Mr. Hart had no intention of arresting the Plaintiffs. He also had no intent to intimidate or
 6 threaten Plaintiffs with arrest. Importantly, Mr. Hart had no authority to arrest Plaintiffs. (*Decl. of*
K. Hart, ¶ 18). CACI Jury Instruction 3066, would require the following: “Mr. Hart caused
 7 Plaintiffs to reasonably believe that if they exercised their First Amendment right, Mr. Hart would
 8 commit violence against them or their property.” In a footnote in an unpublished decision former
 9 District Court Judge David Levi quoted this book with approval regarding the use of the
 10 “common parlance” definition of the word “intimidation,” by describing the definition of
 11 intimidation—“to make timid or fearful” [*Zamora v. Sacramento Rendering Co.*, 2007 WL
 12 137239 (E.D. Cal. 2007)], quoting § 3:19. *Prohibited conduct* et al.

13 Here, Plaintiffs are extremely experienced demonstrators with a long history of
 14 interactions with law enforcement. They are also experienced in perceiving threats of arrest or
 15 actual arrests both being arrested on multiple occasions. Plaintiffs never heard a statement that
 16 they would be imminently arrested or arrested at all. Mr. Hart never uttered the word ‘arrest.’
 17 Importantly, Plaintiffs actions as stated above tend to show Plaintiffs were not in reasonable fear
 18 of arrest by Mr. Hart at any time. Additionally, Mr. Hart’s specific words never included the word
 19 “arrest”, nor “violence.” Plaintiffs as experienced in demonstrations and dealing with law
 20 enforcement did not perceive Mr. Hart’s words as threats, coercion or intimidation. Plaintiffs do
 21 not cite any Bane Act cases that show the same or similar words spoken by Mr. Hart are
 22 actionable as threats, intimidation or coercion as a matter of law. Plaintiff Bolbol stated at the
 23 time that “I think they’re just messing with you, Pat.” Additionally, Plaintiff Cuvillo testified
 24 that he did not believe Mr. Hart had the ability to arrest him at the time of the incident. Plaintiffs
 25 do not define what statements constitute “threats, intimidation or coercion” in Bane Act
 26 jurisprudence as defined in California or federal courts. Therefore, whether the words uttered by
 27
 28

1 Mr. Hart with the combined circumstances of the evening constituted “threats, intimidation or
 2 coercion” are in favor of the HARD Defendants and at the very least a triable issue of fact for a
 3 jury.

4 **H. Plaintiffs' Assertion that Mr. Hart and Deputy Mayfield “Acted in Concert”
 5 is False and Lacks Factual Support**

6 Here, Plaintiffs’ SAC states without factual support that Mr. Hart and Deputy Mayfield
 7 “acted in concert” at the time of the subject incident. This is purely conclusory and untrue. As
 8 stated in the facts section, Mr. Hart had no authority to arrest Plaintiffs. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 18).
 9 At no time did Mr. Hart instruct Alameda County Deputies to arrest Plaintiffs nor instruct
 10 Alameda County Deputies to threaten Plaintiffs with arrest. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 19). Mr. Hart did
 11 not coordinate nor plan a response to the demonstrators with Deputy Mayfield nor anyone else
 12 from the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department at any time prior to his interactions with Plaintiff.
 13 (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 20). Mr. Hart had no weapon on his person during his interactions with
 14 Plaintiffs nor any handcuffs. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 22). Based on these facts, no reasonable jury
 15 could find that Mr. Hart and Deputy Mayfield “acted in concert” to allegedly deprive Plaintiffs of
 16 their First Amendment rights. Criminal case law discusses actions “in concert” between two
 17 separate entities or individuals at volume in criminal law (See, Judicial Council Of California
 18 Civil Jury Instruction 3610 et al.). Courts have extended liability in 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 causes of
 19 action between state and federal agencies. However, Plaintiffs have not plead or argued, and
 20 HARD Defendants have not found case law extending acts in concert to allegation of a Bane Act
 21 violation.

22 Plaintiffs’ claims that Mr. Hart and Deputy Mayfield “acted in concert” are purely
 23 conclusory and not supported by the facts. For these reasons, the actions of each Defendant Mr.
 24 Hart/HARD and County of Alameda/Deputy Mayfield should be evaluated on their own merits
 25 without the inclusion of the combined action of both actors when there is no evidence of a
 26 conspiracy present here.

27 **I. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish a Violation of 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 as a Matter of
 28 Law as HARD Defendants are Subject to Qualified Immunity and Cannot
 Establish Available Equitable Remedies Under Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of**

1 Action

2 Qualified immunity public officials are shielded from liability for civil damages “unless a
 3 plaintiff pleads facts showing: (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional rights, and
 4 (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct. *Ashcroft v. al-*
 5 *Kidd*, 563 — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (citing *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800,
 6 818 (1982).) A right is clearly established if -- at the time of the challenged conduct -- “every
 7 reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” *Ashcroft*,
 8 *supra*, 2083 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

9 As stated above, element one has not been determined and HARD Defendants vehemently
 10 deny any constitutional right was violated here. When discussing element (2) in *Harlow* it’s clear
 11 that Mr. Hart did not understand that any right was being violated by his actions and that the
 12 standard of “every reasonable official would have understood he was violating Plaintiffs
 13 constitutional rights” has not been properly plead by Plaintiffs.

14 In *Grossman v. City of Portland*, 33 F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), the plaintiff was
 15 arrested for demonstrating in a public park without a permit in violation of a city ordinance that
 16 turned out to be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Ruling that the arresting officer was
 17 protected by qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit found “[t]his ordinance, which had been duly
 18 promulgated by the city council, was not so obviously unconstitutional as to require a reasonable
 19 officer to refuse to enforce it.” *Grossman* at 1210. The plaintiff clearly violated the ordinance and
 20 the defendant correctly believed that the ordinance required a permit. The Ninth Circuit also
 21 observed that “an officer who reasonably relies on the legislature’s determination that a statute is
 22 constitutional should be shielded from personal liability.” *Id.*

23 Where the plaintiff alleged that a police officer seized his still camera in February 2001 in
 24 order to retaliate against him in violation of his First Amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit
 25 declared that “a right exists to be free of police action for which retaliation is a but—for cause
 26 even if probable cause exists for that action.” However, the defendant was entitled to qualified
 27 immunity because he did not violate clearly settled law at the time. Indeed the right was then “far

1 from clearly established in this Circuit or in the nation.” See §8:72. *Law enforcement officers in*
 2 *the circuits—First Amendment, 2 Nahmod, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of*
 3 *Section 1983* §8:72.

4 Here, a security plan was created by the Rodeo group renting the park for the day which
 5 Mr. Hart was aware of from his previous review and approval. (*Decl. of K. Hart*, ¶ 4). The “free
 6 speech area” was designated in the immediate area of the entrance to the parking lot. (*Decl. of K.*
 7 *Hart*, ¶ 5). Mr. Hart attempted to enforce the “free speech area” with the reasonable belief that the
 8 “free speech area” was constitutionally enforceable. This situation is illustrated in *Grossman* and
 9th Circuit case law which allows for the mistaken belief of the lawfulness of an officer’s action
 10 and is squarely defensible by qualified immunity. For these reasons, qualified immunity shields
 11 the HARD Defendants and the 42 U.S.C.A §1983 cause of action should fail as a matter of law.

12 Additionally, Plaintiffs’ cause of action is for injunctive relief in the form of both a
 13 temporary and permanent injunction. The issuance of a permanent injunction requires the
 14 application of a familiar four-step framework in which the plaintiff: must demonstrate: (1) that it
 15 has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
 16 are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of the hardships
 17 between the [parties], a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest will not be
 18 disserved by a permanent injunction. *Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Lopez-Freytes*, 522 F.3d 136, 148
 19 (1st Cir. 2008).

20 As stated in the Order, “The Park District’s declaration explains that its rangers will not
 21 even be at the rodeo and will therefore have “no interaction with protesters who may come to the
 22 rodeo event.” Dkt. No. 40 at 1. To the extent any allegedly unlawful behavior is reported to the
 23 rangers, the rangers have been instructed simply to report it to local law enforcement. Dkt. No. 40
 24 at 2.” (Quoting, Dkt. 46, p. 1-2).

25 Therefore, as argued above element one is disputed, but Plaintiffs cannot prove that,
 26 considering the balance of the hardships between the [parties], a remedy in equity is warranted
 27 here as the alleged issues have been remedied. Again the “free speech area” has been moved
 28 toward the ticket booth entrance area and HARD Defendant rangers will not be present going

1 forward the for the Rodeo events and if HARD rangers are on the property they've been
 2 instructed not to call law enforcement regarding failure to demonstrate in the "free speech area."
 3 Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief, related to the First Amendment violation cause of
 4 action should fail as a matter of law.

5 **J. First Amendment Violation Cause of Action Should Fail Due to Mootness and**
Satisfaction of Equitable Remedy

6 Plaintiffs seek both a temporary and permanent injunction against HARD Defendants due
 7 to alleged First Amendment violations. The issuance of a permanent injunction requires the
 8 application of the familiar four-step framework found above in *Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Lopez-*
Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 148 (1st Cir. 2008).

9 As discussed in Judge Chhabria's Order regarding Plaintiff's Application for Temporary
 10 Restraining Order (Dkt. 46), Rowell Ranch has satisfactorily remedied any alleged First
 11 Amendment violation of time, place and manner restrictions regarding the "free speech area" as it
 12 has been moved to a constitutionally proper area near the entrance to the event. Specifically,
 13 "Rowell Ranch declares that it has designated a second free speech zone fifteen to twenty feet
 14 from the ticket booth closest to the pedestrian entrance to the arena, around where the plaintiffs
 15 typically demonstrate. Rowell Ranch further declares that "[d]emonstrators are *not* limited to the
 16 Free Speech Area to hand out their leaflets or engage the attendees" and that its employees "have
 17 *not* been instructed to call any law enforcement department simply because a demonstrator is not
 18 demonstrating in a Free Speech Area." Dkt. No. 43 at 2 (emphasis added)." (Dkt. 46 pp. 1-2, RJD
 19 ¶ 3).
 20

21 Further, as stated in the Order, "The Park District's declaration explains that its rangers
 22 will not even be at the rodeo and will therefore have "no interaction with protesters who may
 23 come to the rodeo event." Dkt. No. 40 at 1, RJD ¶ 4). To the extent any allegedly unlawful
 24 behavior is reported to the rangers, the rangers have been instructed simply to report it to local
 25 law enforcement." Dkt. No. 40 at 2, RJD ¶ 4); (Dkt. 46 pp. 1-2, RJD ¶ 3).
 26

27 Therefore, as argued above element one is disputed, but Plaintiffs cannot prove that,
 28 considering the balance of the hardships between the [parties], a remedy in equity is warranted

1 here as the alleged First Amendment issues have been remedied. Again the “free speech area” has
 2 been moved toward the ticket booth entrance area and HARD Defendant rangers will not be
 3 present going forward for the Rodeo events and if HARD rangers are on the property they’ve
 4 been instructed not to call law enforcement regarding failure to demonstrate in the “free speech
 5 area.” Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief, related to the First Amendment violation
 6 cause of action should fail as a matter of law as the issue has already been remedied.

7 **K. Mr. Hart is Entitled to Dismissal of Punitive Damages**

8 A plaintiff is allowed to recover punitive damages in a Section 1983 case, where the
 9 defendant’s conduct is “shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves
 10 reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” *Smith v. Wade*, 461
 11 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (1983). There is no evidence the individual defendants acted with evil
 12 intent or reckless or callous indifference. The purpose of Mr. Hart’s words directed toward
 13 Plaintiff Cuvillo was to attempt to move Plaintiff to the “free speech area,” not a deliberate or
 14 malicious act to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights. State-law punitive damages also fail. California
 15 Code of Civil Procedure § 3294(a) only permits punitive damages where it is proven “by clear
 16 and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Civil
 17 Code §3294. There is no evidence Mr. Hart acted in such a manner. Mr. Hart responded to
 18 complaints about the demonstrators. There was no intent to cause injury to Plaintiffs or any
 19 actions with willful and conscious disregard of their rights.

20 **V. CONCLUSION**

21 For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request their cross motion for summary
 22 judgment be granted and Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint dismissed with prejudice and
 23 Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment be denied.

24 Dated: June 28, 2024

ALLEN, GLAESSNER,
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25
 26 By: /s/ Nicholas D. Syren
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